Beyond profitability: effects of acquisitions on technical efficiency and productivity in the italian pasta industry. by Luigi Benfratello
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 14/1999
BEYOND PROFITABILITY:
EFFECTS OF ACQUISITIONS ON TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY
AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE ITALIAN PASTA INDUSTRY
Luigi Benfratello
(Ceris-Cnr, Turin and University of Rome “Tor Vergata”)
December 1999
Abstract
Unlike traditional studies on the efficiency-enhancing effect of ownership changes – which use
either profitability measures or stock prices – this paper measures the effect of acquisitions
directly on acquired firms’ technical efficiency. Using a panel of Italian firms in the pasta
industry for the 1981-1997 period, I estimate a stochastic production frontier with factors
affecting efficiency (i.e. the Battese and Coelli (1995) model), in a translog specification with
non-neutral technical progress. The results show that acquired firms’ technical efficiency
increases within the six years period following the acquisition, regardless of the nationality of
the acquirer, and that a more productive use of resources, in particular labour, is the main source
of this increase. However, the analysis beyond the six years period casts some doubts about the
persistency of this increase.
Keywords : Acquisitions, Technical efficiency, Factor Productivity.
JEL Classification: L40, L66.
Corresponding address:
CERIS-CNR
Via Avogadro, 8
10121 TORINO
ITALY
I am very grateful to Guido Pellegrini, Laura Rondi, Alessandro Sembenelli and Davide
Vannoni for very useful suggestions on an earlier draft; I also wish to thank Anna Bottasso and
Secondo Rolfo for helpful discussions. All remaining errors are mine.
This paper further develops the third chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation in Economics at the
University of Rome “Tor Vergata”.
An earlier draft of this paper has been presented at the 26th EARIE conference, Turin,
September 1999.
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 14/1999
Contents
1. Introduction.................................................................................................................7
2. Effects of ownership changes: old debates and new approaches............................9
2.1. Old debates.............................................................................................................9
2.2. New approaches...................................................................................................12
3. The pasta industry in Italy and the data used........................................................13
3.1. The restructuring of the pasta industry and the acquisition
process..................................................................................................................13
3.2. The sample and the variables used ......................................................................15
4. Empirical specification.............................................................................................17
5. Results ........................................................................................................................20
5.1. Technical efficiency..............................................................................................20
5.2. Changes in factor productivity ............................................................................23
6. Final comments .........................................................................................................25
References ......................................................................................................................26
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 14/1999
7
1. Introduction
Mergers and acquisition have been widespread in western economies since a very
long time. The passing of Antitrust laws in Canada and US at the end of last century
witnesses public policy’s concerns about the effects of these changes in ownership.
Also the economic literature has been deeply interested in firms’ decisions to
grow externally, investigating some of the characteristics of these operations, such as
their micro- and macro-economic determinants and their effects.
Despite this deep interest, most of these issues have remained unsolved, so that
this topic is still very controversial. For instance, a harsh debate exists in literature on
whether and how changes in firms’ ownership affect firms’ performance; in particular,
two issues have been theoretically investigated and empirically tested, but without
conclusive results: whether mergers and acquisitions generate private benefits and if the
private benefits are also social benefits.
Actually, empirical analysis designed to shed lights on these topics have relied on
methodologies that are able to address directly the first issue and only indirectly the
second one. The lack of a direct analysis of the real source of the change in performance
is unsatisfactory also for policy purposes, as antitrust legislations forbid mergers that
increase market power, balancing in some cases the anticompetitive effects with the cost
savings that mergers could generate.
Hence, it is not surprising that recent literature has used new kind of data and new
methodologies in order to address directly the second issue, focusing on the effect on
specific components of firm’s performance, such as market power on the one hand and
productivity or efficiency on the other.
This paper belongs to this recent stream of literature, as it analyses the impact of
ownership change on acquired firms’ technical efficiency, i.e. their ability to transform
resources into output. This paper differs from previous literature in two respects: the
data and the time horizon. First, this paper is the first in-depth study of a specific
manufacturing industry, the pasta industry in Italy, unlike most previous literature that
either analyse many industries or focus on a specific public utility or the service sector.
The choice of this specific manufacturing industry, motivated by the large restructuring
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process that this industry has experienced in last decades, with a relatively high number
of acquisitions, is important in two respects. First, most mergers and acquisitions take
place in the manufacturing sector, while changes in ownership in services tend to occur
because of particular institutional changes (such as deregulation) and hence are
concentrated in specific periods. Second, the use of more homogeneous data allowed by
the focus on a specific industry can hopefully lead to more precise results.
The second special feature of this work is time horizon: the vast majority of
acquired firms exit the sample only six or more years after the acquisition, so that in this
paper it is possible to assess not only the short term effect (3-4 years after the
acquisition) as it is usually done in literature, but also the medium long-term impact of
ownership change.
The main result of this paper is that acquired firms enjoy, within the six years
period following the acquisition, a significant increase in their technical efficiency, and
that the increase in labour productivity could be considered the major source of this
effect. Moreover, no specific effect is found for multinational acquirers. However, the
performance of acquired firms observed in a longer period tend to deteriorate, so that
the persistency of the improvement in performance brought in by the change in
ownership is doubtful.
These results partially confirm most of the results of previous literature,
supporting the view that acquisitions are, at least in the short-medium run, a device for
improving acquired firms’ performance through a better use of resources. However, no
conclusion can be drawn about the social desiderability of these acquisitions, for a
double reason: on the one hand, their social desiderability can be evaluated only after
analysing also the effect on acquired firms’ market power and the effect on acquirers;
on the other, the decrease in technical efficiency in the longer run, a result almost new
in literature and that needs further investigation, casts some doubts about the persistency
of the increase in performance.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Next section reviews the classical
literature on mergers and acquisitions that uses the old methodologies and the recent
one that looks, like this paper, at specific components of firm’s performance, in
particular at the ownership changes’ effect on productivity and efficiency. Description
of the pasta industry in Italy and the data used are presented in section 3. Section 4
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contains the empirical model, while section 5 comments upon the results. Some final
remarks conclude the paper.
2. Effects of ownership changes: old debates and new approaches
2.1. Old debates
An old and harsh debate exists in the economic literature on whether and how
changes in firms’ ownership affect firms’ performance.
In particular, two main themes have been investigated: whether mergers and
acquisitions generate private benefits and if the private benefits are also social benefits,
i.e. the ownership changes create value or only transfer value from some subjects
(labour forces, rival firms, consumers, etc.) to new owners.
Regarding both questions, there are two opposite views.
One stream of literature, mainly neo-classical, asserts that mergers and
acquisitions lead to an increase in private profitability: in the Structure-Conduct-
Performance paradigm, in fact, mergers and acquisitions lead to an increase in market
share and hence in profitability. To this view, scholars belonging to the managerial
school (Marris (1964), Mueller (1969)) oppose the idea that acquisitions are mostly
motivated by the pursuit of growth maximising objectives, and thus have no particular
effect on firms involved.
Concerning the source of the gains due to the change in ownership, some scholars
argue that acquired firms will benefit, after the acquisition, from minor costs, through
synergies with the acquirer, i.e. economies of scale or scope (Williamson (1968)) or
correction of managerial failures (Manne (1965)), so that the private gains are generated
by a better use of resources and hence are also social gains. On the other hand, there is
the idea that merging firms will benefit from larger market power in the product market,
through an increase in market share or multimarket contact (Scott (1989)), or will
benefit from extra profits transferred from other acquired firm’s stakeholders, such as
labour forces, so that the increase in profit does not correspond to a social gain (or even
correspond to a net loss) for the society as a whole.1
                                                
1 Of course, this distinction is so clear only for expository purposes: in reality an acquisition can have
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Empirical analysis of the effects of mergers and acquisitions – or more generally
of ownership changes – have been traditionally performed with two alternative
methodologies: one is based on profitability indicators, such as Return on Assets, or
Equity or Investment, and – to a lesser extent – on growth and financial indicators, all
computed from balance sheet data; the other is based on stock prices movements around
the acquisition date.2
As far as the first methodology is concerned, the approach used has been that of
measuring some performance indexes before and after the change in ownership, using a
control group of other firms of same size and industry in order to control for
macroeconomic effects, and testing whether these indexes differ significantly. Mueller
(1996) contains a review of this traditional methodology; it also summarises the main
results obtained by this literature, characterised by a general scepticism towards the
effects of mergers and acquisitions.
The methodology based on stock prices uses the so-called “event study
methodology”, which is a general methodology used to assess the impact of new
information (such as the announcement of a takeover) on firm’s stock prices. In short,
the idea is to construct a “normal” stock return, i.e. a return that could be expected in
absence of new information, and then to measure the “abnormal” return around the
announcement date as the difference between the actual and the “normal” return. 3
These two methodologies suffer from some shortcomings, some related to their
own nature, others due to their use for assessing the source of the gains generated by
mergers and acquisitions.
Concerning the criticisms to the real nature of these methodologies, the use of
profitability indicators from balance sheet data has been heavily criticised (Fisher &
McGowan (1983)) on the ground that accounting rates of return do not correspond to
economic rates of return, measured as the discount rate that equates the present value of
investment’s expected net revenue stream to its initial outlay; the “event study
methodology” heavily relies on the questionable assumptions of efficient stock markets
                                                                                                                                              
both a market power and a cost reduction effect.
2 For a clear distinction of the two methodologies see Caves (1989).
3 The “normal” return is usually measured through the so-called market model, where the normal return is
the expected return of the stock given the market return. For details about this and alternative methods for
measuring “normal” returns see Armitage (1995).
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(see Scherer & Ross (1990)) and its results are sensitive to the different time windows
used to estimate the expected returns (Magenheim & Mueller (1988)).
On the other hand, these methodologies appreciate only the impact on firm’s
general performance, such as its market value and its profitability. They do not allow,
instead, to assess the impact on specific components of this performance, such as the
impact on market power or productivity and/or efficiency, whose evaluation is quite
important in policy terms. In fact, antitrust policies are usually designed to prevent
mergers that increase market power and sometimes (for instance, the U.S. legislation)
they balance the increase in market power with the cost savings generated by the
merger. The need to answer the question of the source in private profitability has led
scholars to devise indirect (but unsatisfactory) methods for assessing the source of
firms’ alleged increased performance.
In fact, some event studies (Eckbo (1983), Eckbo & Wier (1985)) have tried to
assess the effect of acquisitions on market power or efficiency through the analysis of
rival firms’ stock prices reactions to the announcement of the takeover and of the
subsequent antitrust intervention. These authors have argued that in a market power-
increasing merger the pattern of rival firms’ stock prices reactions is necessarily an
increase at the announcement of the merger and a decrease at the announcement of the
antitrust litigation. However, Schumann (1993) has shown how any pattern of rivals’
stock prices movement is compatible with a cost-reducing or a market power-increasing
merger.
On the other hand, studies based on balance sheet data, recognising the difficulty
in assessing directly market power or efficiency, either rely on the joint examination of
several indicators (for instance, Hughes, Mueller and Singh (1980, p. 43) suggest to
look jointly to profitability, sales and stock prices in order to have an insight of the
efficiency or market power effect of mergers) or adjust profit and revenues for changes
in input and output prices (Cowling et al. (1980)).
It is clear that to address such a delicate question as the effect of acquisition on
market power and efficiency more appropriate methods were needed.
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2.2. New approaches
All the considerations outlined in the previous section have led economists to
address the problem of investigating the source of the gains to merging firms directly
with new data and new methodologies. This has led to study the effect of ownership
changes on market power or prices (as proxy for market power), and to analyse their
impact on productivity and efficiency of parties involved in mergers and acquisitions.
As this study follows the latter line of research, attempting to go beyond profitability
and assessing the effects of acquisitions on acquired firms’ technical efficiency and
productivity, a brief review of this literature is in order4.
The pioneering work has been Lichtenberg & Siegel (1987), who find that US
plants changing ownership between 1972 and 1981 experienced an increase in the
growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP). Their result has been subsequently
confirmed by McGuckin & Nguyen (1995) using US plants in the food and beverage
industry for the 1977/87 period. Also Baldwin (1995), using Canadian plant level data
in the ‘70s, confirms the general conclusion of a positive effect of acquisitions on labour
productivity; however, he also finds that this impact varies with the type of acquisition,
being larger for horizontal acquisitions than for unrelated ones, and that foreign
acquisitions perform better than domestic ones.
There have also been two other types of analysis of the impact of acquisitions on
efficiency and productivity: those focusing on specific industries and those focusing on
a specific type of transaction.
Among the first group, the banking industry is the most intensively studied. The
results of these studies are not completely consistent, although there is a certain
evidence of an improvement in the efficiency of firms involved. Vander Vennet (1996)
analyses some 500 takeovers among European banks and finds an increase in efficiency
only for domestic mergers between banks of similar size and for cross-border
acquisitions; Akhavein, Berger & Humphrey (1997) report a positive impact on profit
efficiency for 57 US “megamergers” in the ‘80s; Resti (1998) finds a positive impact on
technical and cost efficiency for 67 changes in ownership of Italian banks. The only
                                                
4 See Gallet (1996) for a direct measure of mergers’ impact on market power. For analyses of the price
effect see Prager & Hannan (1998) and the references therein.
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contrary finding is that of Peristiani (1997), who finds a negative impact of acquisitions
on cost efficiency for mergers occurred in US between 1980 and 1990.
Among the specific types of transactions the most analysed have been
privatisations and Management buy-outs (MBO): in both cases the reduction of the
agency costs induced by the change in ownership suggests that this change would lead
to an increase in efficiency.
As far as privatisations are concerned, Boussofiane, Martin & Parker (1997) find
mixed results for 9 UK privatised enterprises; Waddams-Price & Weyman-Jones (1996)
report an improvement of technical efficiency in UK gas industry while Fraquelli &
Erbetta (1999) find no improvement for Italian privatised firms, except for those
acquired by foreign groups.
Regarding MBO, Amess (1997 and 1998) finds higher levels of productivity and
technical efficiency for UK firms under management’s control than for other firms in
the same industry. As the control group includes also the same firms before they
underwent a MBO, it can be indirectly inferred that the change in the organisational
structure has brought in the improvement in performance.
Summing up, previous literature suggests that the change in ownership generally
leads to an increase in productivity and/or efficiency, and that nationality of the acquirer
can matter, as targets acquired by foreign firms tend to show the largest increase in
efficiency. With this scatter evidence in mind, we now turn to our empirical exercise.
3. The pasta industry in Italy and the data used
3.1. The restructuring of the pasta industry and the acquisition process
Pasta is a typical Italian product: in fact, this country is the world largest producer,
consumer and exporter of pasta.
During the period under study in this paper, i.e. the ‘80s and the ‘90s, this industry
has experienced the end of a massive restructuring process, begun at the end of the
second world war.
On the demand side, domestic demand and export have followed different
dynamics. In fact, domestic demand is in a maturity phase, with a slow growth rate
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(21% in the 1981-1997 period); this is due to a 100% penetration in Italian families and
to the slowly substitution of pasta by other goods. On the contrary, export has sharply
increased, so that exports in volume have been in 1997 four time larger than in 1981 and
now represent more than 40% of total production. The overall effect on production has
been an 80% increase in the 1981-1997 period.
On the other hand, there has been a sharp modification of the supply. During the
‘60s the industry was characterised by a large number of small, one-plant local
producers, operating in small geographical markets. Over time, however, the increased
competition among producers, the diffusion of big retailers that necessitate of
continuous restocking and technological innovation that has decreased the
competitiveness of small scale plants have progressively led to the exit of a large
number of small, local producers.5 From 1981 to 1997 the number of operating firms
has decreased from 238 to 149.
The combined effect of the increase in the demand and the decrease in the number
of producers has led to the increase in the average productive capacity of surviving
entities and to the increase in concentration: the former has grown in the 1981/97 period
from 42.1 to 88.2 tons/day, while the latter has risen from 27.9% to 36.3%.6
Related to this restructuring process, there has been a large number of changes in
ownership: from 1983 to 1998 (data for the period before 1983 are not available) there
have been 24 acquisitions, listed in table 1.
The main feature of this process has been the entry of some multinationals,
motivated by two main reasons: the willingness to enter the rich Italian pasta market
pursuing a geographical and product diversification strategy (BSN and Nestlé) and the
willingness to have a direct control over acquired firms’ products exported into the
home market (Borden and C.S.M.). Notice that two of these foreign firms have
subsequently resold the acquired firms.
                                                
5 In particular, we refer to the introduction of the high temperature dryer: this innovation reduces drying
time, and hence increases productivity, preserving at the same time the quality of the pasta. As the new
technology cannot be introduced for small capacities, this innovation has put small plants in a cost
disadvantage and hence has increased the mimimum efficient scale.
6 All these figures underestimate the restructuring phenomenon, as most of the restructuring process had
already taken place by 1981. In fact, consider that in 1961 the number of plants was 990, with an average
productive capacity of 9.2 tons/day.
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Other important aspects of the acquisition process have been the external growth
of market leader Barilla, with five acquisitions between 1983 and 1986, and the
downstream integration of some firms in the milling industry.
3.2. The sample and the variables used
We use balance sheet data of 34 Italian firms in the pasta industry sampled from
1981 to 1997. These data come from two main sources: the Centrale dei Bilanci,  a
private institution which collects them for a network of Italian banks, and Mediobanca’s
yearly publication “Le principali società italiane”; in very few cases the necessary data
have been collected directly from acquired firms’ original balance sheets. Maximum
effort has been put to keep consistency in the data.
The criteria for inclusion in the sample have been the following: firms had to be
not too diversified (according to the criteria below), acquired firms had to have data for
at least 4 years before and 2 years after the acquisition and firms in the control sample
had to have at least nine contiguous observations.
First of all, diversified firms have been excluded from the sample. In fact, firms in
the pasta industry are often diversified in the animal seed industry or vertically
integrated in the milling industry. Moreover, in recent years there has been the diffusion
of the “fresh” pasta, whose characteristics7 make this kind of pasta different from “dry”
pasta and hence, in order to have only homogeneous observations in the sample, I have
decided to include only firms with at least two thirds of their turnover in the “dry”
pasta.8
Moreover, I included in the sample firms acquired in one of the 24 operations of
acquisition mentioned above if at least four observations before and two after the
acquisition were available; at the end, 9 acquired firms were retained. Notice that for 8
out of the 9 firms data are available till 6 years after the acquisition. 9
                                                
7 The drying process of fresh pasta is much shorter, it is usually stuffed and is much more expensive. In
short, it is a luxury good while “dry” pasta is considered an inferior good.
8 The 34 firms in our sample account for approximately the 40-45% (depending on the year) of the whole
Italian production in value. This not very high proportion is due, alongside with the exclusion of
diversified firms, also to the lack – because of continuous internal restructuring – of a sufficiently long
series of homogeneous data for market leader Barilla, who has a market share of approximately 30%.
9 From table 1, it can be noticed that three firms have been acquired and subsequently resold. A double
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Finally, firms in the control sample have been included only if they had a
sufficiently long series of contiguous observations, in order to avoid as much as
possible the entry or exit of firms from the sample. For this reason, only firms with at
least nine contiguous observations were included (table 2 contains the number of
observations for each firms, distinguishing between acquired firms and control sample
and their location).
The data form an unbalanced panel for a total of 501 observations. The main
reasons of the relative unbalancedness of the panel (77 observations missing out of 578)
are two. Inspection of table 3, which presents the structure of the panel, suggests that
one reason is the poor number of observations in the first year (1981) and, to a lesser
extent, the relatively low number in last three years (51 observations missing). This is
due to the sampling process of one of our sources (the Centrale dei Bilanci) and is no
way linked with a particular process of entry or exit of firms: in fact, I have checked that
all firms in the panel in 1994 had not exited the market in 1998. The other reason (that
accounts for 19 observations missing) is the exit of some acquired firms that have
subsequently been incorporated by the acquirer.
The variables used are value added, turnover, net capital stock , investments and
the number of employees. All of them, except the last one, were expressed in current
prices and hence some transformations have been necessary.
Value added and turnover have been transformed in 1983 prices by the
corresponding three digit production price index (industry 417 in the Nace 81
classification). For net capital stock a double operation was necessary. On the one hand,
it has been necessary to “sum” different vintages of physical capital: this has been done
through the perpetual inventory method, using a depreciation rate of 9%, 1983 as
benchmark year and the deflator for investment goods. The choice of 1983 as
benchmark year has been motivated by the need to find a year where balance sheet data
are as close as possible to the real value of technical assets: as the Visentini Law (L.
72/83) allowed in that year a revaluation of assets’ historical cost to market price, it is
                                                                                                                                              
acquisition of a firm can hamper the interpretation of the results, as the years between the two
acquisitions belong at the same time to the period before and after an acquisition. Even if our data contain
two of these firms, we bypass this problem as the period of analysis ends always before the second
acquisition. Also notice that there is no acquirer among the 34 firms in our panel; in fact, as mentioned in
the preceding footnote, a sufficiently long series was not available for Barilla, while the other Italian
acquirer operating in the pasta industry, Tamma, has been excluded because diversified.
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likely that 1983 is the year when the difference between historical and actual value is
minimised. On the other hand, the capital stock calculated in such a way has then been
deflated in real terms at 1983 prices through the deflator for investment goods.10
Investments are investments in technical assets and the number of employees is the
number of workers at the end of the period.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for those variables, dividing between
acquired firms and control sample. It can be noticed that acquired firms are larger than
the control sample, suggesting to control for size. On the other hand, table 5 contains
descriptive statistics for the same variables, dividing observations for acquired firms in
four relevant sub-periods, chosen according to the criteria explained in the next section:
the main feature is that in the period immediately after the acquisition labour decreases
and capital increases with respect to the period immediately before. This suggests that
acquisitions could have had an impact on factors utilisation and hence on efficiency; to
test this and related hypothesis I turn now to the empirical specification.
4. Empirical specification
Among the different methods used for measuring technical efficiency, I have
chosen to adopt a stochastic frontier approach. 11 This approach is based on the
specification of a functional form of the production function (e.g. Cobb-Douglas or
translog) and adding to the usual error term, representing statistical noise, another term
representing the departure from the production frontier, i.e. the inefficiency of the firm.
The advantage of this method is that it allows to appreciate the statistical significance of
the estimated parameters.
More specifically, I used the model recently proposed by Battese & Coelli (1995),
which allows for the inclusion of time-variant and firm specific explicative variables in
                                                
10 More precisely, to construct net capital stock at current prices I use the following standard recursive
formula of the perpetual inventory method:
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where k t is the stock of capital, It are investments and pt are investment goods price index, all referred at
time t. For firms entering the panel after 1983, the benchmark year is the first available year.
11 Literature on efficiency measurement has grown exponentially in recent years. For excellent references
see Fried, Knox Lovell & Schmidt (1993) and Coelli, Rao & Battese (1998).
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the inefficiency component of the error term, in a two factor translog specification of
the production function and non-neutral technical change.
In other terms, I have employed the following equation:
)(2220 itititLTitKTititKLTTitLLitKKTitLitKit utltklktlktlky -++++++++++= ubbbbbbbbbb (1)
where yit, lit and kit are log of value added, number of employees and capital
(deflated according to the criteria discussed above) and t is a time trend starting in 1981
(i.e. t=1 for observations in 1981 and t=17 for observations in 1997).
The error term has a double component typical of stochastic frontiers: a noise
component, itv , and an inefficiency component, itu . In this particular model itv  is a
classical disturbance term (normally identically and independently distributed:
)i.i.d.N(0,~ 2v it sv ), while itu  is independently distributed according to a truncated
normal distribution, with truncation at 0, that assures non-negativity:
),i.d.TN(m~ 2uit it su , 0 it ³u .
The distinguishing feature of the Battese and Coelli model is that the mean of the
truncated normal distribution is a linear function of explicative variables: d'itm itz= ,
where d is a vector of parameters to be estimated and zit represent the time/individual
specific variables affecting efficiency: they affect it by shifting the mean of the
truncated normal distribution from which uit is drawn. Note that a negative coefficient
of a z variable imply a negative effect on the estimated technical inefficiency and hence
a positive effect on estimated technical efficiency.12
For estimation purposes it is useful to reparametrise the model in terms of:
2
u
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v sss +=
2  and 2
u
2
v
2
u
ss
s
g
+
= . The first parameter ( 2s ) is the sum of the
variance of the error term and of the inefficiency term. The second parameter is the ratio
of the variance of the truncated normal from which the inefficiency term is drawn to the
sum of this variance and that of the statistical noise: as its value is bounded between 0
                                                
12 For further details on this topic see Coelli, Rao & Battese (1998), ch. 9.
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and 1, this reparametrisation helps the iterative procedure to find the maximum
likelihood solutions.13
For the purposes of this paper, I have used four groups of variables affecting
efficiency: one is the direct object of this study while the others control for time,
location and size effects.
One set are dummy variables relating to the acquisition process, and are the direct
object of the present study. More precisely, I have used 5 dummy variables, called
dt-9,t-5; dt-4,t-1; dt; dt+1,t+6 ; dt+7,t+11: these variables take a value of 1, only for acquired
firms, when the observation year is, respectively, from 9 to 5 and from 4 to 1 years
before the acquisition year, is the acquisition year, is from 1 to 6 and from 7 to 11 years
after the acquisition year. The role of such dummies is to isolate acquired firms from
the rest of the sample, and to evaluate the effect of the acquisition. The reason why to
isolate, both before and after the acquisition, the observations located far from the
acquisition year is that only from four years before to six years after the acquisition year
I have (almost) balanced data (see table 6). Moreover, as will be clear in next section,
the choice of the 6th year after the acquisition as the end of the short- medium run effect,
proves to be the best to highlight the difference between the short-medium run impact
and the longer run effect. On the other hand, as it is usually done in studies on
ownership changes’ impact, the acquisition year has been isolated as in that year it is
impossible to distinguish the effect of the new ownership from that of the old one.
The second set of variables are dummy variables representing firms’ location. As
already mentioned, the Italian pasta market is becoming geographically more integrated,
so that local markets are disappearing. Nonetheless, firms in the South of Italy still
enjoy, because of brand loyalty, some local market power that protects them from
outside competition. For this reason, I have used location dummy variables,
distinguishing southern, central and northern regions.14
                                                
13 Note that g is not the proportion of the total variance accounted for by the variance of the inefficiency
term, as this variance is smaller than 2us  because of truncation.
14 See the note in table 1 for the list of regions belonging to the North, the Centre and the South of Italy.
The distinction between the North and the Center has been done to check that the only regional difference
was between the South and the rest of Italy and not among the three Italian macro regions. Table 2 shows
that our control sample is well balanced with respect to location, and that only one acquired firm is
located in the South.
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The third set of explicative variables are related to calendar years. As
macroeconomic conditions can differ from a year to another, a dummy variable for each
calendar year has been used, in order to capture the effect specific to each year.15 The
use of time dummies is suggested by the consideration, as Table 7 shows, that
acquisitions in our sample are concentrated in the 1985-91 period, so that the four
dummy variables above (d t-9,t-5; dt-4,t-1; dt+1,t+6 ; dt+7,t+11) take positive value in different
periods: for instance, d t-9,t-5 is positive in correspondence with the years ranging from
1981 to 1986, while d t+1,t+6  is positive in correspondence with the years ranging from
1986 to 1997.
Finally, last explicative variable is size, proxied by turnover. The need to control
for size is jointly motivated by the consideration that size, for organisational reasons,
can affect efficiency and that, as already mentioned, acquired firms are larger than firms
in the control sample (see table 4).
5. Results
5.1. Technical efficiency
Results of the estimation of equation (1) are presented in table 8, while table 9
contains the statistical tests.16
In table 8, estimated parameters of four models are presented. In Model 1 only the
location dummy variable and the variables concerning the acquisition are included in
the efficiency term, while Model 2 adds to model 1 also the time dummies in the
efficiency term. In Model 3 the impact of acquisition in the four years before-six years
after period is distinguished according to the nationality of the acquirer. Finally, Model
4 controls that the results of Model 1 are robust to a size effect, adding this variable,
proxied by turnover, in the inefficiency term; in particular, I added two dummy
variables: one (whose parameter is labelled dsmall) takes a value of 1 if the firm, in that
                                                
15 Notice the difference between this and the first set of dummy variables affecting efficiency: in the first
set the dummy is referred to the temporal distance to the acquisition year and not to the calendar year.
16 We will rely exclusively on Likelihood Ratio tests (LR henceforth) and not on asymptotic t or Wald
tests as the former does not require the estimation of the coefficients’ variance-covariance matrix that, as
the model is non-linear, is only an approximation of the real one.
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year, is below the 66th percentile of the distribution, the other (whose parameter is
labelled d large) takes a value of 1 if the firm, in that year, is above the 33rd percentile. 17 18
Concerning the production function, there is no significant difference among the
parameters of the first three models and the production function seems to be well
specified: an LR test rejects the Cobb-Douglas model in favour of the translog model
and the hypothesis of neutral technical progress is rejected versus that of non-neutral
technical progress (see table 9).19 Moreover, there is some evidence of slight scale
economies (the sum of capital and labour elasticity is around 1.07).20 Technical progress
is significantly labour saving and capital augmenting and the yearly growth rate of
technical progress is slightly above 3%: although this is a quite high value for a
traditional industry as pasta, this is due to some important process innovations in the
period under study. 21 The only significant difference in the production function is due to
the inclusion of size dummies that, as it could be expected, affects scale economies: in
fact, in model 4 the sum of the elasticities of capital and labour is only 1.01.
As far as the variables affecting efficiency are concerned, all models give fairly
similar results.22
                                                
17 Notice that instead of choosing, on statistical basis, which model is the “true” model we have preferred
to show all estimated models to check the robustness of the estimated impact of acquisitions on
efficiency.
18 It must be stressed that the inclusion of size as an explicative variable of inefficiency is doubtful, as
probably the converse relation (from inefficiency to size) is the true one. In any case, size is certainly
endogeneous with respect to efficiency. With this caveat in mind, I include size in order to control for the
robustness of the results concerning the effects of acquisition.
19 Only specification tests performed with respect to model 1 are presented in table 9, as specification
tests performed on the other models give very similar results.
20 Input elasticities are calculated according to the following formula:
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 where i  and j  are the logarithms of the input sample means. As time is not in logarithms, to obtain the
yearly growth rate of technical change is sufficient to apply formula (1) for i=t.
21 The main technological progress has been the introduction of high temperature dryer that has reduced
drying time and hence has increased productivity. See also footnote 5.
22 The estimated value of g deserves some comments. This value is quite high in all models (above 0.85)
indicating that statistical noise plays a minor role and hence this model is similar to a deterministic
frontier model with no random error. Moreover, as the value of the parameter is very significantly
different from 0, this model performs better, in statistical terms, than a model where z regressors are
simply included in the production function.
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On one hand, location matters in terms of efficiency. In fact, the parameter for the
three Italian macro-regions are jointly very significant; as the parameter for North and
Centre were very close, table 8 reports only one parameter, that for the South. As it can
be seen, the parameter is positive and significant, implying that firms located in the
South are significantly less efficient than the others.
Turning to the variables linked to the acquisition process, models 1 and 2 give
very similar results.
The parameter d t-4,t-1 is positive, implying that before the acquisition acquired
firms were less efficient than the control group; on the contrary, the parameter d t+1,t+6  is
in both models negative, showing that after the acquisition acquired firms had become
more efficient than the control group. To appreciate the statistical significance of the
difference between d t-4,t-1 and dt+1,t+6, that gives the impact of acquisition on efficiency, I
performed an LR test of the constraint d t-4,t-1 = dt+1,t+6 , which is presented in table 9. This
hypothesis is rejected at a 5% level in both models, even if the p-value (that measures
the credibility of the null hypothesis) is higher in the second model, where specific
calendar year effects are controlled for.23
Notice the value of the parameter d t+7,t+11, that is positive and significant. This
means that firms observed 7 or more years after the acquisition are less efficient than
the control sample. This casts some doubts about the persistency of the improvement in
acquired firms’ technical efficiency, even if one must consider that for only five firms I
have data 7 years after the acquisition and for only three 8 years after (see table 6).24
In model 3 I have split the sample of acquired firms according to the nationality of
the acquirer. As mentioned in section 2, in fact, previous empirical literature has shown
that in some cases foreign firms’ acquisitions have increased acquired firms’ efficiency
more than domestic acquisitions. The split of dt-4,t-1 and dt+1,t+6  in two parameters each,
for domestic (labelled d t-4,t-1;ita and dt+1,t+6;ita) and for foreign acquisitions (labelled
dt-4,t-1;multi and dt+1,t+6;multi) show that the two groups of acquisitions have similar effects,
as both groups improve acquired firms’ technical efficiency. A difference is found
                                                
23 Note that the restriction that all time dummies are jointly equal to 0 is not rejected by a LR test.
24 We have checked that the decrease in efficiency really starts seven years after the acquisition: no firm
but one shows a worsening of its performance in the 5th and 6th year after the acquisition. Quite
interestingly, this result is very similar to the one reported by Baldwin (1995), ch. 10, who finds that
acquired plants experience a sharp decrease in labour productivity in the 7th year after the acquisition.
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between the ex-ante characteristics of firms acquired by the two types of acquirers:
those acquired by foreign firms were less efficient than the control sample before the
acquisition while those acquired by Italian firms were more efficient; however, the
distinction between the two types of acquisitions does not add much information, in
statistical terms, as an LR test does not reject the simpler model (model 1) against the
more general one (model 3).
Finally, the two size class variables included in model 4 as explicative variables of
the inefficiency term are statistically very significant; in particular, small firms appear
to be the least efficient and large ones appear to be the most efficient. Moreover, the
dummy variable for the South is still positive and very significant statistically on the
basis of an LR test. Turning to the effect of acquisition on efficiency, an LR test on the
constraint d t-4,t-1 = d  t+1,t+6  has now a p-value of 0.06, higher than before; this increase is
due to the fact that 4 out of the 9 acquired firms grow over time changing size class so
that part of the increase in efficiency is now attributed to the increased dimensions and
not to the change in ownership.
So, even after controlling for size the estimated positive effect of ownership
changes still has a statistical significance; however, the parameter d t+7,t+11 is still positive
and significant, confirming the doubts on the persistency of the increase in efficiency. 25
5.2. Changes in factor productivity
In order to analyse the source of the increase in technical efficiency, table 10
reports for each of the nine acquired firms labour productivity (measured as deflated
value added divided by the number of employees), capital productivity (measured as
deflated value added divided by capital stock in real terms) and technical efficiency, all
normalised with respect to the control sample and averaged in the four relevant
                                                
25 These results rely on the approximation of output in physical terms with output deflated with a market
price index, an approximation that I have employed all over this paper. I do not believe that the use of
output in physical terms (or a firm-specific deflator) can affect the result of a positive effect of
acquisitions on technical efficiency, as this would require that acquired firms’ output price increase after
the acquisition and that control firms do not benefit from this increase.
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subperiods (t-9,t-5; t-4,t-1; t+1,t+6 and t+7,t+11).26 Table 10 also contains the rates of
growth of capital and labour, averaged in the same four sub-periods.
Notice that for all firms there is at least one factor productivity that increases
between the four year before and the six after the acquisition. This reflect new owners’
willingness to provide an organisational boost to the acquired firm, as is often declared
by acquirers in press statement after the acquisition. Only in six cases out of nine,
however, the increase in partial productivities has led to an increase in technical
efficiency as well.
For all the six firms, but one, having an increase in technical efficiency there is
also the increase in labour productivity, while capital productivity increases only in four
cases. More clear is the difference between the two factor productivities if one considers
the three firms that experience a decrease in technical efficiency: in all cases, the pattern
of change in partial productivity is the same, with an increase in capital productivity and
a decrease in labour productivity.
Overall, there is not a very clear distinction between the two factors, but it seems
that labour productivity is mostly correlated with technical efficiency, while capital
productivity seems to play a minor role.
Turning to the rate of changes of the two factors, in general an inverse
relationship between factor productivity and factor quantity is found. However, the
reduction in labour is in general small and minor than would be expected if labour
reduction would be the only cause of the increase in labour productivity. The same
conclusion can be drawn looking at capital productivity. This suggest that it is a more
productive use of resources, and not the simple downsizing or elimination of the less
productive assets or workers that brings in the increase in efficiency.
Finally, concerning the period from seven to eleven years after the acquisition, it
can be noticed that all firms experience a decrease in capital and labour productivity and
                                                
26 Technical efficiency scores presented in table 10 are approximately equal to 1-ûit: hence a positive
value in the table means that the firm is more efficient than the control sample. The inefficiency
components uit are estimated using a model including only a constant term and the dummy variable for
firms in southern regions as explicative variables of the inefficiency term. This is because the Battese &
Coelli model estimate the inefficiency component given the estimated values of the d parameters, so that
all acquired firms’ efficiency scores would be higher in model 1 than in this simpler model. We believe
that the latter model highlights more clearly the links beetwen changes in technical efficiency and
changes in factor productivity.
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in technical efficiency. This worsening of partial productivity indexes confirms the
doubts about the persistency of the improvement in technical efficiency.
6. Final comments
In this paper I have adopted an approach different from that used by traditional
studies of mergers and acquisitions’ impact. Following the most recent literature, I have
tried to evaluate ownership changes’ effects on acquired firms’ technical efficiency,
linking this effect to changes in factor productivity.
The following results emerge from the analysis.
There is a clear evidence that acquisitions have increased acquired firms’
technical efficiency. This result is robust to changes in model specification and is
consistent with most of the literature on ownership changes’ effects on acquired units’
productivity and efficiency. Moreover, it seems that the reason of the improvement in
performance is due to a better use of resources, in particular of the labour factor, while
no difference is found between domestic and foreign acquisitions. A less clear evidence
concerns acquired firms’ performance beyond the six years following the acquisition: in
fact, there is some evidence that in a longer period acquired firms’ performance worsen,
but we do not know how this result is affected by the very small number of observations
available in the longer period.
At any rate, no conclusion can be drawn concerning the social desiderability of
these operations: this would require also the analysis of the effects on acquiring firms,
alongside with the effect on market power of acquired firms. The latter consideration
suggests a future, hopefully fruitful, line of research.
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Table  1 - Control acquisitions in the pasta industry over the 1983-98 period
ACQUIRER (COUNTRY) ACQUIRER’S
INDUSTRY
ACQUIRED FIRM SELLER DATE LOCATION
1 BARILLA (ITA) PASTA VOIELLO Independent firm 1983 South
2 BARILLA (ITA) PASTA PASTIFICI MERIDIONALI Independent firm 1983 South
3 CASILLO MILLING PASTIFICIO BRIBANO Independent firm 1984 North
4 BARILLA (ITA) PASTA PASTIFICI VIRGILIO COSTA Independent firm 1985 South
5 BARILLA (ITA) PASTA F.LLI QUINTO E MANFREDI Independent firm 1985 South
6 BSN-GERVAIS DANONE  (FRA) CONGLOMERATE PONTE S. GIOVANNI Independent firm 1985 Centre
7 CIR-DE BENEDETTI (ITA) CONGLOMERATE BUITONI Independent firm 1985 Centre
8 BARILLA (ITA) PASTA PASTIFICIO BRAIBANTI Independent firm 1986 Centre
9 GAZZOLA (ITA) ----- ARRIGHI Independent firm 1986 North
10 BSN-GERVAIS DANONE (FRA) CONGLOMERATE PASTIFICIO CHIGI Independent firm 1987 Centre
11 BSN-GERVAIS DANONE (FRA) CONGLOMERATE PASTIFICIO SPIGA Independent firm 1987 Centre
12 BSN-GERVAIS DANONE (FRA) CONGLOMERATE PASTIFICIO MANTOVANO Independent firm 1987 North
13 BSN-GERVAIS DANONE (FRA) CONGLOMERATE PASTIFICIO TOMADINI Independent firm 1987 North
14 BORDEN (USA) PASTA PASTIFICIO ALBADORO Independent firm 1987 North
15 NESTLE' (SWI) CONGLOMERATE BUITONI CIR-DE BENEDETTI 1988 Centre
16 C.S.M. (NED) CONFECTIONERY AUDISIO Independent firm 1988 North
17 NESTLE' (SVI) CONGLOMERATE PEZZULLO Independent firm 1989 South
18 ALIMCO (ITA) MILLING PASTIFICIO PAGANI Independent firm 1990 North
19 PALFIN (ITA) FINANCIAL CHIRICO Independent firm 1990 South
20 BSN-GERVAIS DANONE (FRA) CONGLOMERATE AGNESI Independent firm 1990 North
21 TAMMA (ITA) PASTA AND RICE PASTIFICIO DEL VERDE Independent firm 1991 Centre
22 P.A.I. (FRA) FINANCIAL AGNESI DANONE 1997 North
23 EURICOM (ITA) RICE CORTICELLA Lega delle cooperative 1998 Centre
24 COLUSSI (ITA) CONFECTIONERY AUDISIO C.S.M. 1998 North
Notes:
In bold character the 9 acquisitions for which we have balance sheet data for the acquired firm.
In this table and in the rest of the paper we consider as Northern regions Valle d’Aosta, Piemonte, Liguria, Lombardia, Veneto, Trentino-Alto
Adige and Friuli; as Central regions Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Marche, Umbria, Abruzzi, Molise and Lazio; as Southern regions Puglia,
Campania, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna.
Gazzola is a former partial owner of a firm in the pasta industry who has sold his stakes in that firm and has subsequently bought Arrighi.
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Table 2 - Number of observations by firms, distinguishing between acquired firms and
control sample and location
Number of firms in the control
sample
Number of acquired firms
North Centre South Total North Centre South Total
17 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 1
16 3 6 7 16 2 1 0 3
15 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 2
14 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
13 1 1 1 3 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
10 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Number of
observations
TOTAL 4 9 12 25 4 4 1 9
Table 3 - Number of observations by year
Year
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 TOTAL
Number of
observations
4 30 31 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 32 32 31 30 28 28 25 501
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Table 4 - Descriptive statistics
All sample Control sample Acquired firms
labour capital valueadded turnover labour capital
value
added turnover labour capital
value
added turnover
Mean 131 10417.2 6558.8 32449.3 104 8635.9 5568 26927.7 213.2 15832.9 9571.3 49236.8
St. deviation 180.9 11556.7 7552.7 40658.4 88.4 9353.6 5948.9 28795.6 316.3 15367.9 10619.4 61705.9
Median 84 6500.3 3935.6 19041 69 5164 3212 15864.8 154 9872.2 7364.4 32512.8
Minimum 8 151.6 198 962.8 8 151.6 198 962.8 43 770.3 1628.3 9029.1
Maximum 2172 69406 82189.7 373066.8 406 45037 38003.9 196274.2 2172 69406.1 82189.7 373066.8
Observations 501 377 124
Note :
Capital, value added and turnover are expressed in millions lire, 1983 prices; labour is the number of workers at the end of the year.
Table 5 - Descriptive statistics for acquired firms, split by subperiods
From 9 to 5 years before From 4 to 1 years before From 1 to 6 years after From 7 to 9 years after
labour capital value
added
turnover labour capital value
added
turnover labour capital value
added
turnover labour capital value
added
turnover
Mean 180.9 9024.3 7679.7 48590 322.7 16593.7 11313.2 61423.8 162 17071.9 9348.7 43078.8 139.6 15310.1 7586.4 37308
St. deviation 79.2 6321.6 4925.6 58934.2 534.1 16517.1 16731.1 87765.2 131.7 15542.8 7054.8 43636.8 82.1 16537.3 4400.5 13843.6
Median 189.5 7209.7 6040.2 23369.5 179.5 9614.3 6307.6 30096.9 139.5 12216.9 9376.9 37796.5 96 9600.4 5296 31635.1
Minimum 61 770.3 2133.6 16736 48 1287.9 1628.3 9029.1 43 2068.5 2029.5 9055.7 77 7766.3 3190.6 22086
Maximum 277 21396.6 17341.1 232608 2172 59706 82189.7 373066.8 721 64247.4 39201.4 239611 294 69406.1 16803.6 66659.3
Observations 16 36 50 13
Note :
Capital, value added and turnover are expressed in millions lire, 1983 prices; labour is the number of workers at the end of the year.
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Table 6 - Number of observations for acquired firms, with respect to the acquisition year
t-9 t-8 t-7 t-6 t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t+10 t+11
1 2 4 4 5 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 5 3 3 1 1
Note :
t indicates the acquisition year, t-1 the year before the acquisition year, and so forth.
Table 7 – Number of acquisitions and number of positive observations for each sub-period dummy
variable, by year
Number of positive observations for:Number of
acquisitions
in the year dt-9,t-5 dt-4,t-1 dt dt+1,t+6 dt+7,t+11
1981 0 1 1 0 0 0
1982 0 5 3 0 0 0
1983 0 4 5 0 0 0
1984 0 3 6 0 0 0
1985 1 2 6 1 0 0
1986 2 1 5 2 1 0
1987 2 0 4 2 3 0
1988 1 0 3 1 4 0
1989 1 0 2 1 5 0
1990 1 0 1 1 6 0
1991 1 0 0 1 7 0
1992 0 0 0 0 8 0
1993 0 0 0 0 6 1
1994 0 0 0 0 4 2
1995 0 0 0 0 3 3
1996 0 0 0 0 2 4
Year
1997 0 0 0 0 1 3
TOTAL 9 16 36 9 50 13
Note :
dt-9,t-5  (resp. dt-4,t-1) is a dummy variable that takes value of one, only for acquired firms, if the observation year is
from 9 to 5 (resp. from 4 to 1) years before the acquisition year.
dt  is a dummy variable that takes value of one, only for acquired firms, if the observation year is in the acquisition year.
dt+1,t+6  (resp. dt+7,t+11) is a dummy variable that takes value of one, only for acquired firms, if the observation year
is from 1 to 6 (resp. from 7 to 11) years after the acquisition year.
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Table 8 - ML estimates of equation (1)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
b0
3.909
(6.951)
4.011
(6.166)
3.988
(7.216)
4.184
(5.409)
bK
-0.506
(-2.468)
-0.504
(-2.292)
-0.548
(-2.681)
-0.452
(-2.087)
bL
1.655
(7.820)
1.664
(8.531)
1.704
(8.014)
1.570
(6.745)
bT
0.023
(0.760)
-0.008
(-0.221)
0.026
(0.851)
-0.004
(-0.126)
bK2
0.031
(1.276)
0.027
(1.137)
0.037
(1.493)
0.028
(1.157)
bL2
-0.071
(-2.002)
-0.079
(-2.309)
-0.067
(-1.881)
-0.055
(-1.537)
bT2
0.001
(1.058)
0.002
(2.058)
0.001
(0.945)
0.001
(0.650)
bLK
0.010
(0.186)
0.020
(0.386)
-0.002
(-0.028)
-0.001
(-0.017)
bKT
0.012
(1.863)
0.014
(2.173)
0.010
(1.610)
0.016
(2.494)
bLT
-0.023
(-3.043)
-0.025
(-3.272)
-0.021
(-2.711)
-0.025
(-3.328)
s2 1.037(2.420)
0.515
(3.120)
0.778
(2.672)
0.291
(1.255)
g 0.958(59.193)
0.923
(38.562)
0.944
(43.105)
0.867
(8.869)
d0
-5.162
(-1.928)
-1.722
(-1.622)
-3.542
(-2.000)
-0.975
(-0.670)
dt-9,t-5
-0.022
(-0.054)
0.053
(0.147)
-0.146
(-0.328)
0.247
(0.670)
dt-4,t-1
1.501
(2.245)
0.637
(1.915)
0.465
(1.067)
dt-4,t-1;multi
1.699
(2.350)
dt-4,t-1;ita
-0.502
(-0.877)
dt
-2.777
(-1.668)
-1.180
(-2.015)
-1.827
(-1.503)
-0.668
(-0.722)
dt+1,t+6
-3.032
(-1.751)
-1.173
(-2.027)
-0.451
(-0.676)
dt+1,t+6;multi
-1.457
(-1.765)
dt+1,t+6;ita
-3.497
(-1.660)
dt+7,t+11
2.599
(2.560)
0.875
(2.207)
1.957
(2.454)
1.164
(1.195)
dsouth
2.066
(2.237)
0.833
(2.432)
1.405
(2.315)
0.521
(1.066)
dsmall
0.615
(1.507)
dlarge
-0.537
(-1.475)
eK
0.225
(9.494)
0.224
(11.858)
0.225
(8.799)
0.215
(8.662)
eL
0.846
(29.144)
0.844
(44.083)
0.840
(27.615)
0.792
(22.860)
Technical change (yearly growth rate) 3.3% 3.4% 3.3% 3.2%
Log-likelihood -86.043 -76.186 -85.108 -76.382
Average Efficiency 82.295% 80.973% 82.010% 79.478%
Notes : t-statistics in brackets.
Model 2 is model 1 estimated with 16 time dummy variables in the inefficiency term. Model 3 is model 1
where dt-4,t-1 and dt+1,t+6 are split beetwen italian and foreign acquirers. Model 4 adds to Model 1 size dummy
variables in the efficiency term.
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Table 9 - LR Tests
Restriction Degrees of
freedom
Statistics p-value
Translog vs. Cobb-Douglas (Model 1) 6 63.496 0.000
Non neutral vs. neutral technical progress (bKT = bLT = 0) (Model 1) 2 9.288 0.010
g=d0=dt-9; t-5=dt-4; t-1=dt=dt+1; t+6=dt+7; t+11=dsouth=0 (Model 1) 8 75.115 0.000
dt-4; t-1=dt+1; t+6  (Model 1) 1 5.650 0.017
dt-4; t-1=dt+1; t+6  (Model 2) 1 4.682 0.030
dt-4; t-1=dt+1; t+6  (Model 4) 1 3.54 0.060
dt+7; t+11=0 (Model 1) 1 3.272 0.070
dt+7; t+11=0 (Model 2) 1 2.67 0.102
dt+7; t+11=0 (Model 4) 1 6.368 0.012
dsouth=0 (Model 1) 1 10.368 0.001
dsouth=0 (Model 2) 1 9.248 0.002
dsouth=0 (Model 4) 1 11.664 0.001
Time dummies=0 (Model 1 vs. Model 2) 16 19.714 0.233
dt-4,t-1;multi = dt-4,t-1;ita and dt+1,t+6;multi = dt+1,t+6;ita (Model 1 vs. Model 3) 2 1.87 0.393
dsmall=dlarge=0 (Model 1 vs. Model 4) 2 19.322 0.000
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Table 10 - Acquired firms’ averages of technical efficiency, labour and capital
productivity, yearly growth rates of labour and capital, by sub-period
sub-period
t-9, t-5 t-4, t-1 t+1, t+6 t+7, t+11
Capital productivity 0.240 -0.489 -0.023 -0.077
Labour productivity -0.229 5.320 -2.691 -9.584
Technical efficiency 0.060 0.062 0.028 0.004
Capital Rate of growth 83.391% -0.875% 11.725%
FIRM 1
Labour Rate of growth 5.075% 0.987% -0.732%
Capital productivity -0.095 0.012 -0.208
Labour productivity -1.508 -8.795 -16.099
Technical efficiency 0.055 0.008 -0.058
Capital Rate of growth 16.398% 24.081% 11.624%
FIRM 2
Labour Rate of growth -1.911% 11.575% -2.530%
Capital productivity -0.816 0.026 0.441 0.205
Labour productivity -13.221 -0.519 -10.025 -17.767
Technical efficiency -0.133 0.032 0.038 0.017
Capital Rate of growth 14.559% 18.768% 5.140% 0.984%
FIRM 3
Labour Rate of growth 0.799% 4.332% 5.477% -2.943%
Capital productivity 1.096 -0.033
Labour productivity -2.858 6.268
Technical efficiency 0.033 0.050
Capital Rate of growth 38.512% 18.983%
FIRM 4
Labour Rate of growth -0.546% -0.429%
Capital productivity 0.618 -0.188
Labour productivity -6.445 9.637
Technical efficiency 0.010 0.053
Capital Rate of growth 35.933% 20.418%
FIRM 5
Labour Rate of growth -19.516% -15.247%
Capital productivity -0.507 -0.403 -0.085
Labour productivity 0.797 -1.841 11.556
Technical efficiency -0.002 -0.041 0.063
Capital Rate of growth 17.127% 10.790% -3.884%
FIRM 6
Labour Rate of growth 14.312% -4.819% 2.853%
Capital productivity 0.910 -0.033 0.032 -0.019
Labour productivity 9.354 18.977 0.206 -3.238
Technical efficiency 0.090 0.097 0.053 0.043
Capital Rate of growth 137.608% 10.550% 6.842% -2.842%
FIRM 7
Labour Rate of growth 9.935% 9.261% -0.280% 2.564%
Capital productivity 0.622 -0.680 -0.471 -0.616
Labour productivity 27.182 -3.250 25.848 10.804
Technical efficiency 0.112 -0.264 -0.007 -0.168
Capital Rate of growth 31.155% 56.904% 2.102% 25.219%
FIRM 8
Labour Rate of growth -4.674% -8.444% -0.173% 0.000%
Capital productivity -0.649 -0.304
Labour productivity 2.234 2.670
Technical efficiency 0.038 0.043
Capital Rate of growth -1.203% -4.111%
FIRM 9
Labour Rate of growth 2.443% -2.947%
Note : Figures for capital and labour productivity and for technical efficiency are the mean over the sub-period of the
difference with the corresponding value of the control sample for each year. Capital productivity and labour
productivity are expressed in millions lire, 1983 prices.
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